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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant Proimtu MMI, LLC ("Proimtu" or "Defendant")
is seeking attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ).
ARGUMENT

I.

Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Respondent H20 Environmental, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff'' or
"H20") arguments in Appellant's Reply Brief in support of its asserted issues on
appeal should be dismissed as untimely and only Plaintiff's arguments in response
to Defendant's sole issue for cross-appeal should be reviewed.

Plaintiff filed its Appellant's Brief (the "Brief') on November 4, 2016. Pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule ("I.A.R.") 34(c), Defendant filed its Cross-Appeal and Answering Brief of
Defendant/Respondent (the "Cross-Brief') on December 1, 2016, 1 within the 28-day deadline
required for a combined response and cross-brief.

I.A.R. 34(c) provides that a cross-

respondent's brief, if any, "shall be filed within 28 days after the cross-appellant's brief."
Furthermore, "[a]ny reply brief shall be filed within 21 days after service of any respondent's
brief." I.A.R. 34(c) (emphasis added). Appellant's Reply Brief (the "Reply Brief') was filed
December 30, 2016. Although Plaintiff styled and titled the Reply Brief as a "reply" in support
of the issues upon which it appeals, Plaintiff addresses both the issues of its own appeal as well
as the issues on cross-appeal. Plaintiffs response to the issues in the Cross-Brief could arguably
have been filed timely, and for purposes of this Reply Brief, Defendant will address Plaintiffs

1

The Cross-Brief was dated and mailed December 1, 2016; however, the Court has listed the
filing date as December 2, 2016.
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However, Plaintiffs untimely arguments which are a reply in support of the Brief and the issues
specific to its appeal should be stricken as untimely. The brief is styled as a reply despite the fact
that Plaintiff mi-:-:r>:n its: rr>:ply dr>:::inlinr>: hy -:evr>:n (7) ii::iy-: ::inti ::i-:-:r>:rts ::irgnment-: in rr>:s:pon<::P: to

Defendant's issue on cross-appeal. In the event the Court determines that such arguments are not
to be stricken, Defendant responds to the substantive arguments below.
II.

Defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in
Idaho.
Even construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to establish that

Defendant's conduct connects it to the forum in a meaningful way as is required for a finding of
purposeful availment to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Walden v. Fiore, 134
S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). Regardless of whether the facts are viewed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff still has the burden of showing that Defendant purposefully availed itself of
doing business in the forum and Plaintiff cannot and has not been able to meet that burden. See

Menkem v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007).
First, Plaintiff claims that the District Court erred by not reviewing the totality of the
alleged contacts with the forum. However, contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the District Court
not only separately analyzed each alleged contact, but the District Court's analysis also reviews
the alleged contacts as a whole, and the District Court correctly determined that Defendant did
not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Idaho. R. Vol. 1, P.
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case

L

type

of contact as a failure to review the alleged contacts in their totality.
The contacts Plaintiff alleges as the evidentiary basis for its argument that Defendant had
sufficient minimum contacts with Idaho (i.e., the signature line on Mr. Savre's email shmved a
Boise address, the W-9 with a Boise address, Plaintiffs intent to use a Boise bank branch to
process payroll, and mailed payroll information and funds which Plaintiff then processed and
distributed through the Boise bank branch) are as a whole insufficient to establish that Defendant
purposefully directed its activity to Idaho.

Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125; Rupert v. Bond, 68

F.Supp.3d 1142, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir.
2008); Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531,542 (D.N.J. 2002); Barrett v. Catacombs Press,
44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal

Co., 558 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 1977); Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 78,
803 P .2d 978, 984 (1990) (the location of residence of an employee or agent of the company is
purely fortuitous and not determinative of whether minimum contacts have been satisfied); see

also Adv. Tactical Ordinance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d 796, 802-03 (2014); See e.g., LAK, Inc. v.
Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990);
Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988); Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon
Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1987); Scullin Steel Co. v. Nat'! Ry. Utilization Corp.,
676 F.2d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1982); accord Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50 (1st Cir.
2005).

7
12503853. l

of sufficient minimum contacts by Defendant. The District Court determined that the alleged
contacts were unilateral acts of Plaintiff. R. Vol. 1, P. 000154, L. 9-15. The case law cited by
the District Court and the Cross-Brief is clear that these contacts are insufficient Walden, 134 S.
Ct. at 1125; Rupert, 68 F.Supp.3d at 1168; Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28;

Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 542; Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 729; Aaron Ferer & Sons
Co., 558 F.2d at 455; see also Adv. Tactical Ordinance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 802-03; See e.g.,

LAK, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1300; Am. Greetings Corp., 839 F.2d at 1169; Kerry Steel, Inc., 106 F.3d
at151; Scullin Steel Co., 676 F.2d at 314; accord Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50.
Once again, Plaintiff tried to bolster its argument by citing to Southern Idaho Pipe &

Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977). Plaintiffs
argument appears to rely upon restating its argument in the Brief and ignoring Defendant's case
law and argument in the Cross-Brief responding to Plaintiffs misguided arguments. As noted in
the Cross-Brief, Plaintiffs entire argument rests upon Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co., a case
involving a multitude of communications including contacts with more than one business in the
state and affirmative solicitation via advertising circulars, not the vastly different alleged
contacts based on unilateral acts of Plaintiff which occurred in this matter. 98 Idaho at 497,
567 P.2d at 1248.

Thus, the case is vastly different from the minimal interactions and

communications Plaintiff alleges in this lawsuit and cannot support Plaintiffs argument.
The unilateral activities of a plaintiff are irrelevant under a personal jurisdiction analysis.

Phillips, 530 F.2d at 28 (requiring that a defendant's contacts "must be deliberate, and 'not based
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510

Cir. 2007)).

(1st

Plaintiffs signature line of its own email, along with its choices of business

location, bank branch to process payroll, and location to process mailed payroll information and
distribute funds are all unilateral acts of Plaintiff ,md carn1ot establish personal jurisdiction over

the Defendant.
Mere knowledge of such information is not enough to create minimum contacts as
discussed above and does not transmute the unilateral acts of one party into the unilateral acts of
the party that merely has information of the other party's location and actions. Walden, 134
S.Ct. at 1125; see also Phillips, 530 F.3d at 28. Plaintiff has not and cannot show specific acts
that Defendant undertook which constitute sufficient minimum contact with Idaho. Plaintiff's
rhetoric and argument solely alleges the same alleged contacts throughout this litigation in its
failed motion practice which have been shown to be insufficient. See Reply Brief, at 4, 6.
Third, Plaintiff's argument that the minor contacts in which Defendant participated
somehow imbue Defendant's mere potential knowledge of Plaintiff's location with greater
import sufficient to establish minimum contacts is misguided. Plaintiff has not provided any
case law which indicates that the actions which it alleges constitute minimum contacts (i.e., the
signature line on Mr. Savre's email showed a Boise address, the W-9 with a Boise address,
Plaintiff's intent to use a Boise bank branch to process payroll, and mailed payroll information
and funds which Plaintiff then processed and distributed through the Boise bank branch) is
sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction. In fact, Plaintiff urges the Court to reject the case law
finding that mere knowledge is insufficient because of the other insufficient unilateral actions of
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Reply

not err in

following established case law that determined mere knowledge is insufficient, unilateral
activities of the Plaintiff are irrelevant (a point which Plaintiff has not disputed), minor emails
and phone calls are insufficient, and intermittent correspondence is insufficient under a personal

jurisdiction analysis to subject a defendant to a foreign forum.

Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125;

Rupert, 68 F.Supp.3d at 1168; Phillips., 530 F.3d at 28; Machulsky, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 542;
Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 729; Houghland Farms, Inc., 119 Idaho at 78, 803 P.2d at 984; Aaron
Ferer & Sons Co., 558 F.2d at 455; see also Adv. Tactical Ordinance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 80203; See e.g., LAK, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1300; Am. Greetings Corp., 839 F.2d at 1169; Kerry Steel,

Inc., 106 F.3d at 151; Scullin Steel Co., 676 F.2d at 314; accord Harlow, 432 F.3d 50.
Notably, Plaintiff fails to address or even respond to Defendant's argument and case law
regarding the District Court's appropriate action in determining that Defendant did not submit to
the jurisdiction of Idaho by filing its Statement of Costs and Fees. Thus, Plaintiff has abandoned
its erroneous argument from its Brief and the issue need not be addressed in Defendant's Reply
Brief.
III.

The analysis of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, while not
required in this litigation, necessitate that the dispute be litigated in Nevada.
Plaintiffs claim in its untimely Reply Brief that Defendant did not address H20's

arguments and authority regarding whether personal jurisdiction comports with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice ironically ignores its own lack of discussion of the
topic and Defendant's comprehensive argument in the Cross-Brief. Plaintiffs own treatment of
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to

two sentences

Plaintiff

acknowledges that the prong exists and that if Plaintiff meets its burden in proving the first
prong, the burden to defend against the second prong shifts to Defendant. See Brief, at 10.

in the Brief. See Cross-Brief, at 16.
First, Plaintiff's own authority in the Brief acknowledges that any burden to show that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice is only
triggered if Plaintiff first satisfies the burden of showing that Defendant purposefully availed
itself of Idaho jurisdiction. See Brief, at 1O; Menkem, 503 F.3d at 1057 (9th Cir. 2007); Ballard
v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (1995) (citation omitted). The District Court determined that

Plaintiff did not meet this burden and neither the Brief nor the Reply Brief provide adequate
argument that such a burden has been met. Indeed they cannot, because as articulated in the
Cross-Brief and above, Plaintiff is unable to meet this burden with the paltry acts it alleges
somehow in totality equate to purposeful availment.
Second, Defendant addressed Plaintiff's two sentences of text on the topic in the CrossBrief by delineating the reasons why Plaintiff failed to meet the first prong. The majority of the
Cross-Brief is devoted to just this issue as is the argument above.
Third, Defendant's argument is not an attempt to circumvent the second prong analysis,
but merely a response based on the case law presented by Plaintiff that such analysis was not
required upon a finding by the District Court that purposeful availment does not exist in this
case.
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the
and substantial justice here, as the District Court correctly found. Despite Plaintiff's wishful
thinking and careful manipulation of facts in the Brief and the Reply Brief, this dispute is
bet~?1een t\VO 1'Je, ada companies in\ 01"·ving the salaries of Nev ada construction vvorkers vvho
1

1

1

worked on a solar plant in Nevada. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party when the
dispute is based upon contracts that were not intended to be performed within the purported
forum state and without a substantial connection to the purported forum state offends traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 558 F.2d at 450. The
District Court made a clear finding of fact that the Parties dispute involves a contract for Plaintiff
"to hire and employ Nevada-based construction laborers for a solar project in Tonopah, Nevada."
R. Vol. 1, P. 000151, L. 24-26. Plaintiff cannot circumvent this finding by now claiming that in

contradiction to the District Court's Order that the contract involved a payroll contract to be
performed in Idaho as argued in its Reply Brief. See Reply Brief, at 8. Plaintiff's business
location and its unilateral choice of location to pre-screen Nevada construction workers
performing work in Nevada is insufficient to convert a contract involving the payment and use of
Nevada workers in Nevada to perform a Nevada contract into a contract to be performed in
Idaho.
Traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice, while an unnecessary analysis
given Plaintiff's failure to meet its burden of showing purposeful availment, necessitate that any
litigation involving the dispute take place in Nevada where the parties and the center of the
dispute are located.
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Reasonable Attorneys'

Costs to

Defendant Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(1).

Plaintiffs Reply Brief overlooks the mandatory nature of an award of attorneys' fees
under Idaho Code §12-120.

Instead, Plaintiff's Reply Brief focuses on Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 54 ("Rule 54") and fails to even mention Idaho Code § 12-120. Plaintiff does not
independently cite to any case law and cites solely to an excerpt of the District Court's Order and
Rule 54.
The Statement of Costs was filed pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1) mandating that
"[i]n any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there
shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees." Idaho Code § 12-120(1) does not specify
that a specific manner or form of filing or that a separate attorney fee application be filed, but
rather requires the court to fix a reasonable amount as attorneys' fees "as part of the costs of the
action."
The case law cited by the District Court includes one case in which the court issued an
award pursuant to the mandatory requirement to do so under Idaho Code § 12-120(1), despite
some disagreement over the amount to be awarded, and another case in which the analysis is
solely based upon Rule 54 and the discretionary Idaho Code § 12-121 and does not include a
request for fees as part of the costs of the action under Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ). See Medical
Recovery Services, LLC v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 109, 175 P.3d 795, 798 (App. 2007); Hackett v.
Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 262-63, 706 P.2d 1372, 1373-74 (App. 1985). Idaho Code§ 12-120(1)
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is not

and the

as

should

to

amount

award,

not whether to award attorneys' fees. Compare I.C. § 12-120(1) with I.C. § 12-121.
In addition, Rule 54 case law does not require that the party seeking fees provide all of
the information for the factors under a Rule 54 analysis to detennine the amount of fees awarded.
See Hackett, 109 Idaho at 264, 706 P.2d at 1375. Indeed, some of the information to determine

the amount of the mandatory award "may come from the court's own knowledge and
experience" and "some may come from the record of the case," while some information may be
within the sole control of the attorney of the party requesting the fees. Id. However, this is not
an action in which the party requesting a specified amount of fees as costs supplied absolutely no
information. Defendant filed a Statement of Costs thereby providing the statutorily sufficient
required information.
Plaintiff misinterprets the law when it claims that Defendant did not meet its burden for
an award of attorneys' fees, as there is no burden required for a mandatory award of fees. The
District Court did not have discretion under Idaho Code § 12-120(1) to decide not to award fees
as costs. Thus, the District Court erred in denying reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-120(1).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Defendant requests that the Court deny Plaintiff's Appeal and
grant Defendant's Cross-Appeal reversing the District Court's improper denial of attorneys' fees
under Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 2017.
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